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Abstract—This paper addresses the problem of face presentation attack detection using different image modalities. In particular, the
usage of short wave infrared (SWIR) imaging is considered. Face presentation attack detection is performed using recent models
based on Convolutional Neural Networks using only carefully selected SWIR image differences as input. Conducted experiments show
superior performance over similar models acting on either color images or on a combination of different modalities (visible, NIR,
thermal and depth), as well as on a SVM-based classifier acting on SWIR image differences. Experiments have been carried on a new
public and freely available database, containing a wide variety of attacks. Video sequences have been recorded thanks to several
sensors resulting in 14 different streams in the visible, NIR, SWIR and thermal spectra, as well as depth data. The best proposed
approach is able to almost perfectly detect all impersonation attacks while ensuring low bonafide classification errors. On the other
hand, obtained results show that obfuscation attacks are more difficult to detect. We hope that the proposed database will foster
research on this challenging problem. Finally, all the code and instructions to reproduce presented experiments is made available to the
research community.
Index Terms—Face Presentation Attack Detection, Database, SWIR, Deep Neural Networks, Anti-Spoofing, Reproducible Research.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Biometrics is nowadays used in a variety of scenarios
and is becoming a standard mean for identity verification.
Among the different modalities, face is certainly the most
used, since it is both convenient and, in most cases,
sufficiently reliable. Nevertheless, there exists many studies
showing that current face recognition algorithms are not
robust to face presentation attacks [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]. A
presentation attack consists in presenting a fake (or altered)
biometric sample to a sensor in order to fool it. For instance,
a fingerprint reader can be tricked by a fake finger made
of playdough. For the face modality, examples of attacks
range from a simple photograph to more sophisticated
silicone masks. For a wide acceptance of the face biometric
as an identity verification mean, face recognition systems
should be robust to presentation attacks. Consequently,
numerous presentation attack detection (PAD) approaches
have been proposed in the last decade, and surveys can be
found in [6] and [7]. Existing PAD algorithms are usually
classified based on the information they act upon. Some
rely on liveness information, such as blinking eyes [8]
or blood pulse information [9]. Others take advantage
of the differences between bonafide attempts and attacks
through the use of texture [10], image quality measures
[11] or frequency analysis [12]. As expected, there also
exists approaches relying on deep Convolutional Neural
Networks (CNN): relevant examples can be found in [13]
and [14].
While most of the literature presents PAD algorithms
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acting on traditional RGB data, some works also suggest
to tackle presentation attacks using images from different
modalities [15], [16], [17], [18]. For instance, depth
information has been used in conjunction with color images
in [19]. Yi et al. [20] combines the visible and near infrared
(NIR) spectrum to improve robustness against photo
attacks. Thermal imaging has also been investigated to
detect mask attacks in [21]. Steiner et al. [22] proposed an
approach based on short-wave infrared (SWIR) images to
discriminate skin from non-skin pixels in face images. Also,
processing data from different domains with CNNs has
been successfully applied to presentation attack detection:
For instance, Tolosana et al. [23] used SWIR imaging in
conjunction with classical deep models to detect fake
fingers. Regarding face PAD, George et al. [15] proposed
a multi-channel CNN combining visual, NIR, depth and
thermal information. Authors showed that this model can
achieve a very low error rate on a wide variety of attacks,
including printed photographs, video replays and a variety
of masks. Parkin and Grinchuk [24] also recently proposed
a multi-channel face PAD network with different ResNet
blocks for different channels. Before fusing the channels,
squeeze and excitation modules are used, followed by
additional residual blocks. Furthermore, aggregation blocks
at multiple levels are added to leverage inter-channel
correlations. Their final PAD method averages the output
over 24 such models, each trained with different settings
(i.e. on different attack types for instance). It achieved
state-of-the-art performance on the CASIA-SURF database
[25], where only print attacks are considered.
Among the different used sensors, SWIR imaging seems
promising. Indeed, one of its main features is that water is
very absorbing in some SWIR wavelengths. For instance,
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2SWIR imaging is used for food inspection and sorting,
based on water content [26]. Since 50 to 75 % of the human
body is made of water, this modality is hence very relevant
for face PAD. While SWIR imaging has already been studied
in the context of face recognition [27] [28], there are very
few works on this modality in the context of face PAD.
Actually, at the time of writing, there is only one such study
made by Steiner and colleagues [22]. This is arguably due
to the lack of available data: the only database containing
face presentation attack in SWIR is the BRSU database,
introduced in [29]. The BRSU database contains bonafide
images of 53 subjects (there are 3 to 4 frontal face images
per subject) and 84 images of various attacks performed
by 5 subjects. While comprising a relatively large diversity
in terms of attack types (masks, makeup and various
disguises), this database is quite small. It is hence not suited
to assess latest approaches in face PAD leveraging CNNs.
Furthermore, images in the visible spectrum and at various
SWIR wavelengths are not aligned, making face registration
more difficult.
In this contribution, the usage of CNNs in conjunction
with SWIR information is investigated to address face
presentation attack detection. Two recent models for
face PAD are considered: the Multi-Channel CNN
proposed in [15] and a multi-channel extension of the
network with Pixel-wise Binary Supervision proposed in
[30]. These approaches were selected for their capacity
to handle multimodal data, their simplicity (i.e. the
training procedures are straightforward) and their good
performance when different attack types are considered.
These models are fed with a combination of SWIR image
differences, which have been selected using a sequential
feature selection algorithm. To assess the effectiveness
of the proposed approach, a new publicly and freely
available database, HQ-WMCA , is introduced. It contains
video sequences of both bonafide authentication attempts
and attacks recorded with co-registered RGB, depth and
multispectral (NIR, SWIR and thermal) sensors. Moreover,
it contains many presentation attack instruments (PAIs)
including disguise (tattoos, make-up and wigs) alongside
more traditional attacks, such as photographs, replays and
a variety of masks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 presents the transformation and the selection process
applied on recorded SWIR data and the two investigated
CNNs in more details. Section 3 introduces the new HQ-
WMCA database: in particular, it presents the hardware
setup, the different PAIs and the experimental protocols.
Section 4 is devoted to the experimental evaluation. After
having introduced the experimental framework, the two
models using SWIR data are evaluated on the proposed
database and compared to different baselines, including an
SVM-based classifier acting on SWIR data and previously
proposed CNNs using other image modalities. Finally, Sec-
tion 5 concludes the paper.
2 PRESENTATION ATTACK DETECTION APPROACH
In this section, the approaches to face presentation attack
detection are presented. The usage of SWIR data is ex-
plained before proceeding with the description of the two
convolutional neural networks that were considered.
2.1 SWIR data
As mentioned in the introduction, SWIR data has not
(yet) been widely used in face-related tasks, despite its
interesting properties. It has been shown in [31] that, for
water, absorption peaks near 1430nm and this behavior
is particularly suitable for detecting non-skin material.
Indeed, this was already mentioned in [28]: ’The human
skin and eyes in the SWIR spectrum appear to be very dark
because of the presence of moisture’. This phenomenon is
illustrated in Figure 1, where the face image of a bonafide
attempt and of a paper mask attack are shown in different
part of the spectrum.
Fig. 1. A bonafide face image and a paper mask attack in the visible
spectrum (left), at a wavelength of 940nm band (center) and at a
wavelength of 1450nm band (right). Note how the skin appears darker
at 1450nm on the bonafide face image: this is due to water absorption.
On the other hand, this phenomenon is not happening with the mask
attack.
2.1.1 Normalized difference
Instead of directly using images at different SWIR wave-
lengths, a normalized difference between these images has
been considered, as done in both [29] and [23]. This nor-
malization is independent of the absolute brightness and
exhibits differences between skin and non-skin pixels [29].
Consider two SWIR images of the same individual, Is1 and
Is2 , recorded at (almost) the same time
1 but at different
wavelengths, the normalized difference is given by:
d(Is1 , Is2) =
Is1 − Is2
Is1 + Is2 + 
(1)
In our work,  was set to 1e−4. For some reason, pre-
vious works [29] [23] only consider differences between n
SWIR bands with 1 ≤ s1 < n − 1 and s1 < s2 < n.
1. There is a lag of 11ms between frames recorded at different
wavelength, resulting in a total lag of 77ms within the considered SWIR
range.
3However, the subtraction operation is not commutative, i.e.
d(s1, s2) 6= d(s2, s1), hence in our work, all differences are
considered. This allows to have more input data, with pos-
sible complementary information, as opposed to previous
approaches. Since our recording setup allows to capture
SWIR data at no less than n = 7 different wavelength
in each recordings, the number of possible SWIR image
differences is hence given by:
n!
(n− 2)! =
7!
5!
= 6 · 7 = 42 (2)
These 42 differential images may surely be correlated,
and only a particular subset can contain information rele-
vant to face PAD. Furthermore, some of these images may
not contain any relevant information at all. Consequently,
particular care should be made in the selection of the most
useful subset of such differences. The procedure to perform
such a selection is explained in more details below.
2.1.2 SWIR Images Differences Selection
Consider the set containing the 42 possible differences:
S = {d(Is1 , Is2), ..., d(Is7 , Is6)}. As a first step, and similar
to [23], the set has first been ordered according to the inter-
class to intra-class variability ratio, computed in terms of
pixel-wise difference. The pseudo-code for the algorithm to
sort the set of difference is presented in Algorithm 1. For the
sake of clarity, an example ei is considered to consist in 7
SWIR images (and not video sequences) at different wave-
lengths. Note also that the division in the penultimate line
of Algorithm 1 is done element-wise on the 42-dimensional
vectors containing the mean inter and intra-class distances.
At the end of the procedure, the pixel-wise inter/intra-class
ratio is obtained for each of the 42 differences. The ordered
set is then given by sorting the 42 ratios, beginning with the
highest.
Algorithm 1: Pixel-wise intra/inter class ratio.
Input: E = {e1, e2, ..., en}: set of examples
Initialization: kbf , ka = 0, intra = 0, inter = 0
Output: S∗: ordered set of SWIR differences
for ei, ej ∈ E ∀i, j, i 6= j do
Si = [mean(d(e
i
s1 , e
i
s2)), ...,mean(d(e
i
s7 , e
i
s6))]
Sj = [mean(d(e
j
s1 , e
j
s2)), ...,mean(d(e
j
s7 , e
j
s6))]
∆i,j = |Si − Sj |
If ei and ej are bonafide :
intra = intra + ∆i,j , kbf = kbf + 1
If ei is bonafide and ej is attack :
inter = inter + ∆i,j , ka = ka + 1
If ei is attack and ej is bonafide :
inter = inter + ∆i,j , ka = ka + 1
end for
intra = intra / kbf , inter = inter / ka
ratio = inter / intra
S∗ = sort(ratio)
For this purpose, only the training set of the HQ-WMCA
database has been used. This gives a first insight on the
discriminative power of each of the differences between
different SWIR bands for face PAD. In [23] the 3 most infor-
mative SWIR image differences, according to this criterion,
are used to feed CNNs. In our work, it is proposed to extend
this approach by subsequently applying a mechanism to
automatically select the best subset of such differences. As
opposed to [23], our approach is taking the task at hand
into account. For this purpose, a sequential forward floating
selection (SFFS) mechanism [32] has been applied on the
ordered set to select the optimal subset of SWIR differences.
The criterion J used here is the average classification error
rate (ACER) on the development set of the database. Basi-
cally, the SFFS algorithm will sequentially add features (i.e.
SWIR image differences) as input to the CNNs model, and
retain the ones which improves performance. Each time a
feature is retained, a ”backward” step is performed to check
if removing a particular input feature further improves. The
SFFS algorithm is presented in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Sequential Forward Floating Selection
Input: {s1, s2, ..., sn}: ordered set of SWIR differences
Initialization: e∗ = 100.0, S∗ = ∅
Output: S∗, e∗
for i = 1 to n do
S = S∗ ∪ si
e = J (S)
If e < e∗ :
S∗ = S∗ ∪ si
e∗ = e
for j = 1 to |S∗| − 1, j 6= i do
S = S∗ \ sj
e = J (S)
If e < e∗ :
S∗ = S∗ \ sj
e∗ = e
end for
end for
2.2 Deep Convolutional Networks
Deep CNN-based PAD methods have consistently outper-
formed feature based methods, which holds true in a multi-
modal setting as well [15]. In this work two different models
were used, corresponding to early fusion and late fusion
strategies. The main idea is to leverage the joint representa-
tion from information coming from different sources to reli-
ably detect presentation attacks. Note that both investigated
models use a specific backbone architecture (LightCNN for
MC-CNN and DenseNet for MC-PixBiS). While other, more
recent backbones can be used within these frameworks, it
has been decided to stick with backbones proposed in their
original implementation for the sake of comparison. The
two architectures are presented in more details below.
2.2.1 Multi-Channel CNN
The main idea in the Multi-Channel CNN (MC-CNN) is
to use the joint representation from multiple modalities
for PAD, using transfer learning from a pre-trained face
recognition network [15]. The underlying hypothesis is that
the joint representation in the face space could contain
discriminative information for PAD. This network consists
of three parts: low and high level convolutional/pooling
4Fig. 2. Block diagram of the MC-CNN network. The gray color blocks
in the CNN part represent layers which are not retrained, and other
colored blocks represent re-trained/adapted layers. Note that the original
approach from [15] is depicted here: it takes grayscale, infrared, depth
and thermal data as input. In our work, these inputs are replaced with a
variable number of SWIR images differences.
layers, and fully connected layers, as shown in Figure 2.
As noted in [33], high-level features in deep convolutional
neural networks trained in the visual spectrum are domain
independent i.e. they do not depend on a specific modality.
Consequently, they can be used to encode face images
collected from different image sensing domains. The param-
eters of this CNN can then be split into higher level layers
(shared among the different channels), and lower level
layers (known as Domain Specific Units). By concatenating
the representation from different channels and using fully
connected layers, a decision boundary for the appearance
of bonafide and attack presentations can be learned via back-
propagation. During training, low level layers are adapted
separately for different modalities, while shared higher level
layers remain unaltered. In the last part of the network,
embeddings extracted from all modalities are concatenated,
and two fully connected layers are added. The first fully
connected layer has ten nodes, and the second one has
one node. Sigmoidal activation functions are used in each
fully connected layer, as in the original implementation [15].
These layers, added on top of the concatenated represen-
tations, are tuned exclusively for the PAD task using the
Binary Cross Entropy as the loss function. The MC-CNN
approach hence introduces a novel solution for multimodal
PAD problems, leveraging a pre-trained network for face
recognition when a limited amount of data is available for
training PAD systems. Note that this architecture can be
easily extended for an arbitrary number of input channels.
2.2.2 Multi-Channel Deep Pixel-wise Binary Supervision
The Multi-Channel Deep Pixel-wise Binary Supervision net-
work (MC-PixBiS) is a multi-channel extension of a recently
published work on face PAD using legacy RGB sensors [30].
The main idea in [30] is to use pixel-wise supervision as an
auxiliary supervision. The pixel-wise supervision forces the
network to learn shared representations, and it acts like a
patch wise method (see Figure 3). To extend this network
for a multimodal scenario, we use the method proposed in
[34]: averaging the filters in the first layer and replicating
the weights for different modalities.
The general block diagram of the framework is shown in
Figure 3 and is based on DenseNet [35]. The first part of the
network contains eight layers, and each layer consists of two
dense blocks and two transition blocks. The dense blocks
consist of dense connections between every layer with the
same feature map size, and the transition blocks normalize
and downsample the feature maps. The output from the
eighth layer is a map of size 14×14 with 384 features. A 1×1
convolution layer is added along with sigmoid activation to
produce the binary feature map. Further, a fully connected
layer with sigmoid activation is added to produce the binary
output. A combination of losses is used as the objective
function to minimize:
L = λLpix + (1− λ)Lbin (3)
where Lpix is the binary cross-entropy loss applied to
each element of the 14 × 14 binary output map and Lbin
is the binary cross-entropy loss on the network’s binary
output. A λ value of 0.5 was used in our implementation.
Even though both losses are used in training, in the eval-
uation phase, only the pixel-wise map is used: the mean
value of the generated map is used as a score reflecting the
probability of bonafide presentation.
3 THE HQ-WMCA DATABASE
In this section, the new High-Quality Wide Multi-Channel
Attack database, HQ-WMCA is described. This database can
be viewed as an extension of the WMCA database previ-
ously presented in [15]. The proposed database is however
different in several important aspects. Firstly, the various
sensors used to capture data are of better quality and hence
allowed to record video sequences at a higher resolution
and at a higher frame rate than for the WMCA database.
Furthermore, a new sensor acting in the shortwave infrared
(SWIR) spectrum has been added. Additionally, and thanks
to a dedicated illumination module, several NIR and SWIR
wavelengths have been captured. Secondly, the proposed
database contains a wider range of attacks. In particular, it
incorporates obfuscation attacks, where the attacker tries to
hide its identity. In the remainder of this Section, the hard-
ware setup and sensors characteristics are first presented.
The procedure for data recording and a description of the
different attacks is then made before proceeding with the
experimental protocols.
3.1 Hardware Setup
Data were recorded thanks to a custom made sensors suite
with several cameras, as shown in Figure 4. These sensors al-
lowed to record both genuine faces and presentation attacks
in no less than five different image modalities: RGB, NIR,
SWIR, thermal and depth. Information about the different
sensors can be found in Table 1.
TABLE 1
Sensors description
Sensor name Modality Resolution Frame rate
Basler acA1921-150uc Color 1920×1200 30
Basler acA1920-150um NIR 1920×1200 90
Xenics Bobcat-640-GigE SWIR 640×512 90
Xenics Gobi-640-GigE Thermal 640×480 30
Intel Realsense D415 Depth 720×1280 30
Furthermore, four banks of 6 Light Emitting Diodes
(LED) modules are used for illumination besides the am-
bient illumination available in the room. Each LED module
5Fig. 3. MC-PixBiS architecture with pixel-wise supervision. SWIR images differences are stacked before being passed to a series of dense blocks. A
1x1 convolution is then applied to yield the 14x14 supervision map. The top row shows the network fed with a bonafide example, and consequently,
the ground truth for the supervision map is composed of ones. The bottom row shows the same network fed with an attack: in this case, the ground
truth consists in zeros. The supervision map is used to compute the first part of the loss λLpix in Equation 3. Finally, the supervision map is
flattened and a fed to a linear layer with sigmoid activation. The final node is a binary output representing the probability of the presented example
to be bonafide , and is used to compute Lbin.
Fig. 4. Face biometric sensor suite.
consists of LEDs operating in 10 different wavelengths from
735nm to 1650nm, covering NIR and SWIR spectra. Sequen-
cial switching of these infrared emmitters, synchronized
with cameras exposure periods, therefore yields a measure
of multi-spectral reflectivity across the sample. These wave-
lenghts were selected to give the best possible multi-spectral
coverage given market availability. As a result, each record-
ing contains data in 14 different ”modalities”, including 4
NIR and 7 SWIR wavelengths. All cameras have been co-
registered thanks to a calibration procedure, allowing the
captured data to be aligned in each of the modalities.
3.2 Data collection procedure
The data collection was performed during three sessions,
which were typically recorded one week apart. The sessions
were different based on their illumination environment.
The first session was recorded with ceiling office light, the
second using an additional halogen lamp, and the third one
only with LED spotlights facing the subject, and without
any other light source. During each session, data for bonafide
and at least three presentation attacks performed by the
participants were captured, as well as some of the presen-
tation attacks presented on a stand. Since the duration of
a recording was only 2 seconds, it was repeated twice to
include more samples.
The participants were asked to sit in front of the cameras
and look towards the sensors with a neutral facial expres-
sion. The sensors were located at a distance of 50-60 cm for
both bonafide and presentation attacks. If the subjects wore
medical glasses, their bonafide data were captured twice,
with and without glasses. Some of the presentation attacks
such as masks and mannequins were heated up before the
data capture. This was done in order to reach a temperature
close to the one of human body, to avoid a too easy detection
of such attacks with the thermal sensor. The acquisition
operator made sure that the face was visible in all the
sensors before recording.
The presentation attacks in the database have been cap-
tured by presenting more than 100 different Presentation
Attack Instruments (PAIs) to the cameras. The PAIs can be
grouped into ten different categories, as listed below. An
example for each category is shown in Figure 5. Note also
that no attack combination (i.e. glasses and makeup at the
same time) have been considered.
• Glasses: A clear lens glasses with a large frame,
different models of decorative glasses with printed
eyes, and paper glasses.
• Mannequin: Several models of mannequin heads.
• Print: Printed photograph of faces on either matte
or glossy paper using a laser printer (CX c224e) and
an inkjet printer (Epson XP-860). The original photos
were resized so that the size of the printed face is
within the range of a human face.
• Replay: Videos while played or paused and digital
photos presented on an iPad Pro 12.9in. The original
videos used to perform presentation attacks were
captured in HD at 30 fps by the front camera of an
iPhone 6S and in full-HD at 30 fps by the rear camera
of the iPad Pro. Some of the videos were resized so
that the size of the face presented on the display is
6human like and therefore their quality vary.
• Rigid mask: Different types of plastic masks: non-
transparent, transparent without makeup, and trans-
parent with makeup, and custom made realistic rigid
masks.
• Flexible mask: Custom made realistic soft silicon
masks.
• Paper mask: Custom paper masks were made by
printing photos of real identities on matte and glossy
papers using printers mentioned in the ”Print” cate-
gory.
• Wigs: Several models of wigs for men and women.
• Tattoo: Removable facial tattoos based on Maori
tribal face tattoo.
• Makeup: Three different methods of makeup were
performed during the data collection namely “Heavy
Contour”, “Pattern”, and “Transformation”. The first
two methods were performed in three levels of in-
tensity and were designed to change the shape of the
contours and the regular shadows of the face. The
last method was used to transform the face of the
participant to impersonate another identity, normally
a famous character. The data for the latter method
was only captured with one level of intensity and in
order to compensate for the lack of data in this case,
such makeup attacks were captured three times as
opposed to two times for other presentations.
There is a total of 2904 multi-modal presentation video
sequences, for a total of 58080 images (in each modality)
in the database: 555 bonafide presentations from 51 partici-
pants and the remaining 2349 are presentation attacks. This
database is made freely and publicly available for research
purposes2.
3.3 Experimental Protocols
As it is standard practice with classification problems using
machine learning, data has been divided into three sets:
train, validation and test. For an unbiased evaluation, there
is no overlap in identities of the bonafide examples among the
different sets. The statistics for each set are given in Table 2.
As can be seen on Table 3, special care has been taken to
balance attacks across the different sets. Note finally that
each example consists of 10 frames, evenly sampled along
the video sequence.
TABLE 2
Number of examples for bonafide and attack examples in each set. The
number of different identities is given in parenthesis. Note that while
having different identities provides variability for bonafide examples, the
total number of identities is not critical to assess the performance of
PAD. Rather, the number and the variability in the attacks should be
considered.
Train Validation Test
Bonafide 228 (21) 145 (14) 182 (16)
Attacks 742 823 784
In this contribution, different experimental scenarios are
considered. Indeed, experiments have been performed in
three different settings:
2. https://www.idiap.ch/dataset/hq-wmca
TABLE 3
Distribution of attacks in the different sets
Attack type Train Validation Test
Impersonation
Print 48 98 0
Replay 36 100 126
Rigid Mask 162 118 140
Paper Mask 28 24 49
Flexible Mask 90 86 48
Mannequin 20 38 77
Total 384 464 440
Obfuscation
Glasses 56 38 36
Makeup 264 271 258
Tattoo 24 24 24
Wig 14 26 26
Total 358 359 344
1) Grand Test: This scenario considers all possible
attacks, and thus allows to assess the ability of
different PAD approaches to handle a wide variety
of attacks.
2) Impersonation attacks: Impersonation attacks are
defined as attacks in which the attacker tries to
authenticate himself or herself as another person.
Attacks corresponding to this scenario are prints,
replays and masks. Note that masks are not nec-
essarily representing a real, existing identity. In this
work however, all mask attacks are considered as
impersonation attacks since they usually cover the
whole face of the attacker. This protocol has been
implemented by removing all obfuscation attacks
present in the grand test scenario.
3) Obfuscation attacks: In the case of obfuscation
attacks, the appearance of the attacker is altered
in the hope of not being properly recognized by
a face recognition system. Attacks corresponding
to this scenario are typically various forms of dis-
guises, such as glasses, wigs, makeup and tattoos.
This protocol has been implemented by removing
all impersonation attacks present in the grand test
scenario. Note that it is debatable whether such ex-
amples should be considered as attacks per se, since
the person does not necessarily try to bypass a face
recognition system by being identified as someone
else. Nevertheless, the ISO/IEC 30107-3 standard
[36] defines such concealer attacks as a possible mean
to defeat any given face recognition system. Besides,
several studies adressed such disguises in the con-
text of face recognition, such as [37], [38] and more
recently [39], which won the Disguised Faces in the
Wild challenge. It has been consequently decided to
consider such attacks, since they actually impair the
correct operation of a face recognition system: it is
thus important to detect them.
4 EXPERIMENTS & RESULTS
In this section, the performance measures and the experi-
mental setup are first presented. Then, results for different
baselines and proposed approaches are presented and dis-
cussed.
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Fig. 5. Example of attacks present in the database. (a) Print, (b) Replay, (c) Rigid mask, (d) Paper mask, (e) Flexible mask, (f) Mannequin, (g)
Glasses, (h) Makeup, (i) Tattoo and (j) Wig. Note that only one particular example for each category is shown here, but there exists more variation
across the database. For instance, print attacks have been crafted using different printers and different papers.
4.1 Performance Measures
Any face presentation attack detection algorithm encounters
two types of error: either bonafide attempts are wrongly
classified as attacks, or the other way around, i.e. an attack
is misclassified as a real attempt. As a consequence, per-
formance is usually assessed using two metrics. The Attack
Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER) is defined as
the expected probability of a successful attack and is defined
as follows:
APCER =
# of accepted attacks
# of attacks
(4)
Conversely, the Bonafide Presentation Classification Error
Rate (BPCER) is defined as the expected probability that a
bonafide attempt will be falsely declared as a presentation
attack. The BPCER is computed as:
BPCER =
# of rejected real attempts
# of real attempts
(5)
Note that according to the ISO/IEC 30107-3 standard [36],
each attack type should be taken into account separately.
We did not follow this standard here, since our goal is
to assess the robustness for a wide range of attacks. To
provide a single number for the performance, results are
typically presented using the Average Classification Error
Rate (ACER), which is basically the mean of the APCER
and the BPCER:
ACER(τ) =
APCER(τ) +BPCER(τ)
2
[%] (6)
Note that the ACER depends on a threshold τ . Indeed, re-
ducing the APCER will increase the BPCER and vice-versa.
For this reason, results are often presented using either
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) or Detection-Error
Tradeoff (DET) curves, which plot the APCER versus the
BPCER for different thresholds [40]. In our work, the APCER
at BPCER = 1% is reported, as in [15]. Note however that in
the following tables, both APCER and BPCER are reported
on the test set: the threshold reaching a BPCER of 1% is
selected a priori on the validation set. As a consequence,
applying the same threshold on the test set may lead to a
slightly different BPCER.
4.2 Baselines & Experimental Setup
In this section, the baselines used for comparison to the
proposed approaches are presented. Some of the implemen-
tation details are also provided.
4.2.1 Baselines
To assess our approach based on SWIR differences and
CNNs in tackling the PAD problem, we compare its usage
to different baselines. First, we provide results for our
own implementation - and adaptation - of the approach
described in [22]. The algorithm described in [22] is actually
a pixel-based classifier aiming at discriminating skin from
non-skin pixels. For this purpose, the authors used a
so-called spectral signature as feature and a Support Vector
Machine (SVM) as the classifier. The feature vector for a
single pixel is the concatenation of 6 differences between
different pre-selected SWIR wavelengths (935nm, 1060nm,
1300nm and 1550nm). In our work, this pixel-wise classifier
has been adapted to perform presentation attack detection:
the final score for a probe image is obtained by averaging
the probabilities of skin-like pixels in the image. Note also
that for training such a model, and since annotations are
not available at the pixel level, the following strategy has
been applied: the distribution of skin-like pixels has first
been learned using a Gaussian Mixture Model. Then, a
threshold on the likelihood of a pixel to be skin-like has
been found considering both bonafide and impersonation
attack examples in the training set. Finally, every pixels
in all training images have been labelled as either skin or
non-skin. A fraction3 of these data have been used to train
the SVM classifier.
We also provide results using CNNs acting on other
image modalities (visible, infrared, thermal and depth),
as proposed in previous works [15] [30]. Finally, and for
the sake of completeness, results are provided using the
investigated architectures in conjunction with the SWIR
differences used in the context of fingerprint presentation
attack detection [23].
4.2.2 Implementation Details
Faces are first located in each of the 10 frames for each
sequence using an implementation of the MTCNN face de-
tector [41] in the visible spectrum. Facial landmarks are then
detected and used to register face images in the different
modalities. Finally, face images are resized according to the
different model requirements: 128x128 for the MC-CNN and
224x224 for the MC-PixBiS. Note that face images in all
3. Since the total number of pixels in the training set is very large
(100M+ examples), only a fraction of pixels in each image has been con-
sidered as training data for the SVM. Specifically, 1% of pixels in each
image has been retained, which yield a training set of approximately
351’428 positive, skin-like examples and 1’035’376 negative examples.
8modalities but SWIR are further preprocessed as in [15]. For
the SVM baseline, a face size of 128x128 was also used for
consistency. The SVM has an RBF kernel with γ = 0.1. For
the deep models, the MC-CNN is first initialized, in each
channel, with a pre-trained Light CNN model [42] before be-
ing trained for 50 epochs. The MC-PixBiS is initialized with
a DenseNet model pre-trained on ImageNet and is further
trained for 30 epochs. Note however that, at each epoch,
a validation step is performed using the validation set:
the model with the lowest validation error is then further
considered to assess the performance on the unseen test set.
Other training parameters have been set as in [15] and [30]
for MC-CNN and MC-PixBiS respectively. All experiments
have been performed using the bob toolbox [43] and the
code to reproduce all experiments presented in this paper is
freely available for download4.
4.3 Results
In the following Tables, we present the performance of the
baselines described above and for the two deep models
used in conjunction with different combination of SWIR
differences as input. For the baseline algorithms, note that
∆SWIR6 refers to the 6 SWIR differences used in [22],
GDIT stands for Grayscale, Depth, Infrared and Thermal,
and color simply refers to RGB images. Two sets of SWIR
differences have been used in conjunction with the two
CNNs: ∆SWIRfp stands for the (fixed) SWIR differences
used in [23] and ∆SWIRopt refers to the best set of SWIR
images differences found thanks to the SFFS algorithm
(see Algorithm 2). Note that the SFFS algorithm has been
applied for each scenario. Results are presented for the three
scenarios described in Section 3.3.
4.3.1 Generic Performance (Grand Test)
TABLE 4
BPCER, APCER and ACER [%] on the test set of the Grand Test
protocol.
Model Input BPCER APCER ACER
SVM ∆SWIR6 2.7 62.6 32.6
MC-CNN GDIT [15] 0.0 59.8 29.9
PixBiS color [30] 0.1 15.7 7.9
MC-CNN ∆SWIRfp 0.0 10.0 5.0
∆SWIRopt 6.0 7.2 6.6
MC-PixBiS ∆SWIRfp 2.8 10.3 6.6
∆SWIRopt 0.0 9.4 4.7
Table 4 shows the performance when all types of attacks
are considered. As can be seen, the proposed approach
combining MC-PixBiS with optimal SWIR differences found
by the SFFS algorithm, ∆SWIRopt, outperforms all other
approaches, sometimes by a large margin. All approaches
combining CNNs with SWIR differences perform better that
deep models using other modalities and the baseline SVM.
This validates the assumption that deep models acting on
SWIR differences are effective for face PAD. Both architec-
tures perform equally well when used in conjunction with
SWIR data, but the PixBiS using color information only
4. https://gitlab.idiap.ch/bob/bob.paper.pad mccnns swirdiff
performs better than using the MC-CNN acting on a several
modalities including the visual spectrum. This suggest that
the binary pixel-wise supervision for face PAD introduced
in [30] is particularly efficient.
4.3.2 Performance on Impersonation Attacks
TABLE 5
BPCER, APCER and ACER [%] on the test set of the Impersonation
protocol.
Model Input BPCER APCER ACER
SVM ∆SWIR6 2.7 21.5 12.1
MC-CNN GDIT [15] 9.5 0.0 4.8
PixBiS color [30] 0.0 2.0 1.0
MC-CNN ∆SWIRfp 2.0 0.0 1.0
∆SWIRopt 0.9 0.0 0.5
MC-PixBiS ∆SWIRfp 1.7 0.0 0.8
∆SWIRopt 2.2 0.0 1.1
In the case of impersonation attacks, all approaches
perform pretty well, and the best ones are close to perfect
performance, as can be seen in Table 5.
It should be noted that when using color information
only (PixBiS + color), all bonafide examples are correctly de-
tected, as well as most of the attacks: impersonation attacks
usually exhibit different texture patterns and altered image
quality as compared to bonafide examples. Consequently, it
may not be necessary to add other sources of information.
Nonetheless, all the approaches relying on SWIR differ-
ence images (i.e. the last 4 rows of Table 5) achieve compara-
ble or better performance. Moreover, they are all capable of
detecting all attacks, but at the cost of misclassifying some
bonafide attempts. Note however that the BPCER remains
very low, and this proves that SWIR information alone is at
least as efficient as other modalities to detect impersonation
attacks. Also, these results suggest that SWIR image differ-
ences and color contain complementary information in the
context of face PAD.
Finally, it should be noted that the SVM baseline gener-
ally performs worse than all the other approaches: this may
be explained by the local, pixel-wise classification, instead of
a more ”holistic” view, as performed by the CNN models.
4.3.3 Performance on Obfuscation Attacks
TABLE 6
BPCER, APCER and ACER [%] on the test set of the Obfuscation
protocol.
Model Input BPCER APCER ACER
SVM ∆SWIR6 2.7 99.8 51.2
MC-CNN GDIT [15] 0.3 47.1 23.7
PixBiS color [30] 0.1 21.0 10.5
MC-CNN ∆SWIRfp 1.9 27.7 14.8
∆SWIRopt 6.4 28.6 17.5
MC-PixBiS ∆SWIRfp 0.0 27.4 13.7
∆SWIRopt 0.0 23.1 11.5
As evidenced by the error rates reported in Table 6,
obfuscation attacks are generally harder to detect than im-
personation attacks. This makes sense, since they are more
9subtle and usually only affect a portion of the face, as
opposed to impersonation attacks, where the whole face
is covered. Here, the best performance is obtained with
the PixBiS model using color information only. This was
not expected, since in the more generic ”Grand Test” case,
the performance obtained with SWIR image differences is
generally better. This led us to have a closer look on the
results, and consequently, a breakdown per attack type is
presented in Table 7.
TABLE 7
APCER [%] for different attacks on the test set of the Obfuscation
protocol.
PixBiS + color MC-PixBiS + ∆SWIRopt
Glasses 69.3 0.6
Makeup 7.7 13.8
Tattoo 0.0 95.7
Wig 95.2 94.7
Table 7 offers an interesting insight and clearly shows
the differences between the two approaches. The model
relying on color information is good at detecting Makeup
and Tattoo whereas it fails on Glasses and Wigs. On the
other hand, MC-PixBiS + ∆SWIRopt performs very well on
Glasses attacks, but very poorly on Tattoos. These results are
not surprising: tattoos do not actually appear in the SWIR
spectrum, as opposed to glasses (thanks to the different
material). Again, this suggest that these two sources of
information complement each other. Note finally that in this
case, SVM performs very poorly since it is pixel-based, and
that in most cases, the number of skin-like pixels are greater
than non-skin pixels. Consequently, this approach is not
suitable for generic face PAD only and should be coupled
with a face recognition system (as proposed in [22]).
4.4 Discussion
Several observations can be made from the results presented
above. First and foremost, it was shown that the conjunction
of SWIR differences and CNNs is indeed successful in face
PAD and achieve relatively low error rates. This is an inter-
esting result for several reasons. Firstly, it shows that SWIR
information should be considered at the global image level,
as it is the case with CNNs, rather than considering it at the
pixel level (as in the SVM case). This is especially true for
obfuscation attacks, where the number of altered pixels are
not known, and vary (as opposed to impersonation attacks,
where the whole image has been altered). Secondly, while
the PixBiS + color model acting performs well, using SWIR
data yields comparable and even better performance across
all considered scenarios. As shown in Table 7, one can see
that these two modalities are clearly complementary to each
other and this opens new directions for future research.
Table 8 shows the optimal set of differences (see Equa-
tion 1) for each scenario. As it can be seen, the selected
differences are not the same depending on the type of
attacks. It shows that applying a feature selection algorithm
instead of using a fixed set of pre-defined differences is
relevant, since optimal features are task-dependant.
Several additional observations can be made from this
table. Firstly, only a few differences seem to be relevant for
TABLE 8
Optimal SWIR differences for MC-CNN in each scenarios. s1 and s2
refer to the SWIR wavelengths in Equation 1.
Grand Test Impersonation Obfuscation
s1 s2 s1 s2 s1 s2
1550 1200 1550 1200 1450 1200
1450 1200 1450 1200 1550 1050
1200 1550 - - 1200 1550
940 1550 - - 1200 1450
940 1650 - - 1650 1050
- - - - 1450 1550
face PAD: remember that the SFFS algorithm considered an
initial pool of 42 SWIR differences as input. Secondly, less
features are needed when the variability of attacks is limited.
Indeed, for impersonation attacks, only 2 SWIR differences
are used to reach optimal performance. When the set of
different attacks is enlarged, as it is the case in the last sce-
nario, more features are needed. Note also that depending
on the type of attacks, optimal features are not the same.
This again advocates for a mechanism to select relevant
features, depending on the scenario. Finally, it is interesting
to see that in all cases, considered wavelengths fall on one or
the other side of 1430nm. This is not surprising, since water
absorption peaks at around 1430nm and hence skin appears
very dark at this wavelength.
4.5 Cross-database experiment
Cross-database experiments have been conducted to gauge
the generalization ability of deep CNNs using SWIR data.
As mentioned in Section 1, the only database containing
bonafide face images and spoofing attacks imaged in
both color and SWIR domain is the BRSU database [29]. As
compared to the proposed HQ-WMCA database, BRSU only
contains images at 4 different SWIR wavelengths: 935nm,
1060nm, 1300nm and 1550nm. Besides, this database only
contains 276 frontal face images (192 bonafide and 84 attacks),
and it is thus not possible to train the proposed models
with so little data. Consequently, models were first trained
on HQ-WMCA and then evaluated on the 276 images from
BRSU. More specifically, the SFFS algorithm was applied
to find optimal SWIR differences, but only considering
differences available within BRSU.
Since BRSU contains few data, no subset has been used
for validation. As a consequence, one cannot set a decision
threshold a priori. Results are hence presented as ROC
curves. As can be seen on Figure 6, performance is far
from being satisfactory on this database for both the MC-
CNN model and for the SVM baseline. MC-PixBiS, although
overall better, does not generalizes so well since it reaches
an Equal Error Rate (EER, when the threshold is selected
such that BPCER = APCER) of 22.8%.
To go one step further, scores distribution on bonafide im-
ages, obfuscation and impersonation attacks are presented
in Figure 7. This clearly shows that the main issue occurs
with bonafide data. Indeed, most of the scores for both im-
personation and obfuscation attacks are relatively low (i.e.
< 0.5), but scores obtained on bonafide examples are more
10
10 2 10 1 100
APCER
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1-
BP
CE
R
SVM
MC-PixBis
MC-CNN
Fig. 6. ROC curves for the SVM baseline and both CNN models with
optimal SWIR differences on the BRSU database.
spread, with a median of 0.56. Tentative explanations for the
distribution of bonafide scores include i) SWIR wavelengths
present in the BRSU database may not be the most suited for
our models and ii) the differences between bonafide training
data from the HQ-WMCA database and testing data from
the BRSU database.
Fig. 7. Scores distribution (given by MC-PixBiS) on the BRSU database.
5 CONCLUSION
In this contribution, two recent models for face PAD based
on deep convolutional neural networks have been inves-
tigated in conjunction with SWIR image differences. They
have been compared to baselines using either color or a
combination of other modalities (visible, infrared, depth
and thermal imaging), as well as to the adaptation of a
previous approach acting on SWIR data. For this purpose, a
new database for face presentation attack detection has been
introduced. Bonafide attempts and presentation attacks have
been recorded in several modalities, including the short-
wave infrared spectrum, which makes it particularly inter-
esting to develop new approaches leveraging SWIR imaging
properties. Besides, this database contains a large variety of
attacks, that can be split into two categories: impersonation
and obfuscation. Impersonation attacks consists of various
print, replay and mask attacks while obfuscation attacks
comprise different variations of glasses, wigs, makeup and
tattoos.
Experimental results show that the performance of in-
vestigated CNN models with carefully selected SWIR differ-
ences outperform baselines when a large variety of attacks
is considered. Furthermore, combining deep models for
face PAD together with SWIR differences allows to almost
perfectly detect all impersonation attacks while maintaining
a very low BPCER. However, it should be noted that attacks
aiming at hiding one’s identity - as opposed to imperson-
ating someone else - are harder to detect: this suggests
interesting directions for future research. Finally, the gen-
eralization ability of the different models using SWIR data
has been assessed on a cross-database experiment using the
only other publicly available PAD database containing SWIR
data. In this case, a noticeable difference is observed on
bonafide attempts: when trained and evaluated on different
data, proposed models do not generalize well. This can be
explained by the usage of different wavelengths in the SWIR
spectrum, or this can be due to the difference in image
quality between the two databases.
Note finally that the proposed database, as well as the
code and instructions to reproduce presented experiments
have been made freely available to download for research
purposes. This will certainly foster further research efforts
on face presentation attack detection using data from several
image modalities.
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